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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20020048-CA 
v. : 
KELCEY WILLIAMS CUCH, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction of one count of driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, with an enhancement for two or more prior alcohol related reckless 
driving convictions, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(Supp. 2000) (in Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Should this Court review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
defendant's conviction where defendant did not preserve his claim below, did not 
properly marshal the evidence, and misconstrued the statutory requirements? 
Whether a defendant preserved his claim for appeal and properly marshaled the 
facts are questions only for the reviewing court; thus no standard of review applies. 
Whether a statute requires a particular element to be proved is a question of statutory 
interpretation that this Court reviews for correctness. See Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, 
15,31 P.3d 537. 
CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY, AND RULE PROVISIONS 
This appeal involves interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2000), 
which is reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of driving under the 
influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2000) (R. 7-8). The charge, normally a class A or B 
misdemeanor, was subject to enhancement to a third degree felony because of defendant's 
prior alcohol related reckless driving convictions. Id. After a day-long bifurcated trial, a 
jury found defendant guilty of both the primary offense and the enhancement (R. 92; R. 
125:216). 
On December 6, 2001, the court sentenced defendant to a suspended indeterminate 
prison term not to exceed five years (R. 101). Defendant was also sentenced to 180 days 
in the Duchesne County Jail, fined $1000, and placed on probation for three years. Id. 
On December 12, 2001, defendant filed an unsupported motion to stay execution of his 
sentence based inter alia on insufficiency of the evidence (R. 104-05). The trial court 
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entered a final judgment and order on December 21, 2001 (106-11). On January 17, 
2002, the court denied defendant's motion because "at [the] time it [was] not fully 
presented" (R. 117). Defendant timely appealed from the final judgment on the basis that 
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction (R. 115-16). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The stop and arrest. 
In the early hours of January 20, 2001, Officer Luke Stradinger observed 
defendant making an improper lane change in a pickup truck with an unlit rear license 
plate (R. 125:74). When Officer Stradinger turned on his overhead lights and signaled 
defendant to stop, he witnessed a passenger, later identified as Jared Murray, in the truck 
making a "furtive movement out the window" (R. 125:75). Officer Stradinger also noted 
that defendant took longer than usual to pull over. Id. As he approached the pickup 
truck, Officer Stradinger detected the odor of alcohol emanating from the passenger 
compartment of the truck (R. 125:77). He performed two field sobriety tests on 
defendant, both of which indicated that defendant was not under the influence of alcohol 
(R. 125:77-78). Defendant stated that he had not been drinking, but that Murray had (R. 
125:77). Defendant also stated that he did not know Murray, could not remember his first 
name, and was just giving him a ride home (R. 125:78). 
Suspicious, Officer Stradinger ran a warrants check and discovered that both 
Murray and defendant had outstanding arrest warrants (R. 125:80). He promptly placed 
both young men under arrest and conducted a search of the vehicle (R. 125:81). During 
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the search Officer Stradinger discovered a small bag of marijuana in the passenger's door 
pocket and a pipe freshly packed with marijuana on the ground several feet from the 
vehicle (R. 125:81-83). 
The Drug Recognition Evaluation. 
Officer Stradinger took defendant to the Roosevelt City Police Department where 
Officer Troy Marx performed a Drug Recognition Evaluation (DRE) on defendant 
(R. 125:83, 111). A DRE is a standardized evaluation that uses mental and physical tests 
to determine if a subject is under the influence of a drug and, if so, which drug (R. 
125:112). During the evaluation, Officer Marx noted that defendant exhibited body 
tremors and a slight sway, he had trouble following directions and walking in a straight 
line, he had difficulty touching his nose with his fingers, his pupils were dilated above the 
normal range, his eyes were bloodshot, and his eyes exhibited rebound1 (R. 125:117-23). 
According to the DRE, defendant exhibited every indicator of marijuana use but one (R. 
125:123). Officer Marx concluded from the DRE that defendant was under the influence 
of marijuana to a degree that impaired his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle (R. 
125:84, 128, 141-42). Defendant refused to submit to a blood test and stated, "It will 
show hot because I've been around these guys. Fve been breathing second hand smoke" 
(R. 125:124). Officer Marx explained to defendant that he would have to inhale a 
According to Marx's testimony, an eye "rebounds" by dilating bigger and smaller 
in a pulsing fashion; "rebound" is an indicator of marijuana use (R. 125:123). 
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significant amount of second hand smoke in order for it to register on the test. Id. 
Defendant replied, "Obviously I'll test hot. I'm not going to take it". Id. 
Defendant claimed that he had recently ingested lawfully prescribed Codeine 
Tylenol 3 for his arthritic knees (R. 125:173). However, Officer Marx testified that 
Codeine Tylenol 3 has the exact opposite effect upon the body as marijuana, and he 
observed none of the symptoms of Codeine Tylenol 3 during the DRE (R. 125:174). 
Defendant also claimed that the blood in his eyes was caused by a preexisting hematoma, 
not drug use (R. 125:150). When Officer Marx examined defendant's eyes at trial, 
however, he testified that defendant's hematoma was not similar in appearance to the 
bloodshot condition of defendant's eyes the night of the arrest (R. 125:186-88). 
Defendant s story. 
Defendant admitted that he ingested marijuana by inhaling second hand smoke (R. 
125:156). According to defendant, he was contacted by a friend who needed a ride to 
work at a bar at approximately 11:00 p.m., the night of January 19,2001 (R. 125:162). 
At the bar, defendant met up with a few acquaintances, including Jared Murray (R. 
125:163-165). Defendant's friends asked him if they could smoke in his truck (R. 
125:165-66). Defendant acquiesced but stated that he would accompany them to ensure 
that they did not damage or steal anything from his truck (R. 125:165). Defendant and his 
friends went outside where those friends used his truck to create a "hotbox" by smoking 
marijuana in the truck with the windows rolled up (R. 125:166-67). Defendant claims he 
was standing outside the truck and, when he realized what they were doing, asked his 
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fnends to roll the windows down (R. 125:167). When his friends did so, smoke billowed 
out the window "like Cheech and Chong on that movie" (R. 125:167). Defendant stood 
next to the window for fifteen minutes and talked to his friends while they smoked 
marijuana (R. 125:171). During that time, defendant inhaled enough marijuana smoke 
that he became concerned that he had marijuana in his system and, as he testified, 
marijuana is "even worse than tobacco in second hand smoke." Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant presents a single claim on appeal: the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction for driving under the influence of drugs because the State did not 
show that defendant actually drove his truck in an unsafe manner.2 Aplt. Br. at 8. 
Defendant's argument fails because it is unpreserved, defendant did not properly marshal 
the facts, and actual unsafe driving is not an element of driving under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol. 
defendant asks in his Conclusion that this Court vacate his conviction "on the 
basis that the scope of the initial stop and detention had been exceeded by trooper 
Stradinger and the evidence of the DRE should have then been suppressed." Aplt. Br. at 
15. As defendant has not briefed this claim, the State will not address it. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE IT 
WAS NOT PRESERVED BELOW, IS NOT PROPERLY 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND LACKS MERIT 
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence upon which to base a 
conviction for driving under the influence of marijuana because there was no evidence 
which "tie[d] together the use of drugs and the driving pattern as being unsafe." 
Aplt. Br. at 10-11. Such evidence is necessary, he claims, because the State "must 
establish that [he] operated the car unsafely to a degree that he was impaired." Id. at 12. 
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim for appellate review. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, J 11,10 P.3d 346. To properly preserve a claim, 
a party must present the objection to the trial court, state the grounds for the objection 
specifically and distinctly, and ensure that the objection and its supporting arguments 
become part of the trial record. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993). "This rule applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions . . . " Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at^j 11. In the context of 
claims of insufficient evidence, the preservation rule "prevents] a defendant from 
deliberately foregoing relief below on the sufficiency of the evidence, hoping that a 
remediable defect might not be perceived and corrected, thus strategically facilitating the 
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defendant's chance for a reversal on appeal." Id. at % 16. A court may review an 
unpreserved claim only if it finds exceptional circumstances or plain error.3 Id. at f 11. 
Defendant never challenged the sufficiency of the evidence prior to sentencing. 
After sentencing, defendant filed a Motion and Order for Stay of Execution of Sentence 
that listed insufficiency of the evidence as one of multiple bases for the motion (R. 99) 
(attached in Addendum B). However, the written motion contained no supporting 
argument and, after a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied it because it was "not 
fully presented" (R. 117) (attached in Addendum C). 
Defendant's motion to stay execution of his sentence does not properly preserve 
his claim of insufficient evidence because it does not timely present the claim to the trial 
court. A petition to stay execution filed under Rule 27 "does not provide the trial court an 
adequate, timely opportunity to consider the issues raised therein so as to give life to 
unpreserved issues first brought to light in that petition." Brown, 856 P.2d at 362-63. 
Because a Rule 27 motion is made after sentencing, "the trial court considering the 
motion lacks jurisdiction to reconsider the conviction." Id. In other words, claiming 
insufficiency of the evidence through a Rule 27 motion after sentencing is futile because 
the court has no remedy. It may not admit new evidence nor order a new trial; it may 
only stay execution of the sentence pending appeal. 
defendant has not claimed exceptional circumstances or plain error. In fact, 
defendant's brief does not even address preservation of his claim, as is required under the 
rules of appellate procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A) & (B). 
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Defendant's motion to stay execution also does not properly preserve his claim 
because it was not specific. Defendant merely claimed that "[t]here was not sufficient 
evidence to convict" him and provided no other explanation or argument of how the 
evidence was insufficient (R. 104). General objections are usually insufficient to preserve 
an issue for appeal. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361. "The grounds for the objection must be 
distinctly and specifically stated." Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144. "The 'mere mention' of a 
legal issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not 
preserve that issue for appeal." Brown, 856 P.2d at 361. Defendant's motion to stay 
execution is a "mere mention" of insufficiency; it does not explain how the evidence was 
insufficient (R. 104). Add. B. Additionally, the record indicates that the claim was not 
properly preserved even after a hearing was held on the motion because the trial court 
dismissed the motion for not being "folly presented" (R. 117).4 Add. C. 
In short, defendant's appeal smacks of invited error. Defendant never asserted at 
trial that the State had to prove actual unsafe driving, and the court did not instruct the 
jury that it must find that defendant actually drove unsafely. The elements instruction 
read to the jury was based on the statutory language and required only that the jury find 
4Defendant did not include a transcript of this hearing, so the following minute 
entry is the only evidence of the court's reasoning for denying the motion: "The Court 
denies the motion at this time because it is not fully presented." (R. 117). Add. C. If the 
court actually considered the merits of defendant's claim of insufficient evidence at the 
hearing, defendant has failed to include that consideration in the record. Failure to 
support claims with an adequate record is ground for denial of review. State v. Barella, 
714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986). 
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"that defendant was under the influence of any drug to a degree which rendered him 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle" (R. 82, 125:196). Defendant did not raise his 
sufficiency claim until after sentencing when the lower court no longer had jurisdiction 
over the case and could provide no meaningful remedy (R. 104). By choosing not to raise 
his claim before the trial court in good time and with adequate support, defendant has 
denied the trial court and the prosecution any opportunity to correct the alleged error. His 
appeal is contrary to the very reasons in Holgate supporting the preservation rule and 
should be denied. 
B. Defendant's claim fails because he did not properly marshal the facts. 
When a defendant attacks a conviction on sufficiency grounds, he must first 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the conviction and then demonstrate to the Court 
how the evidence is insufficient. "In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling 
the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Ca, 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah. App. 1991). Merely reviewing all the evidence before 
the fact finder is insufficient See Heineck v. Dep 't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459,464 
(Utah App. 1991) (finding that defendant failed to satisfy marshaling obligation where he 
"reviewed in minute detail all the evidence" and "left it to the court to sort out what 
evidence actually supported the findings"); see also State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f60, 
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28 P.3d 1278 (''[Defendant wmust first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial 
court's findings. After marshaling the supportive evidence, the appellant then must show 
that... the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings.'" (quoting State v. 
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108)). Rather, "[cjounsel must extricate himself 
or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position." Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. Failure to meet the marshaling burden is grounds to reject an 
attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16, 
989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant never meets his burden to present a single unified compilation of all the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Defendant's fact statement merely weaves 
supporting and contradictory evidence into a single recitation. Aplt. Br. at 3-7. His 
argument makes a series of citations to the record for the express purpose of meeting his 
marshaling requirement, but even this straightforward attempt fails. Id. at 11. He claims 
that "no marijuana was found on him, [or] was thrown from the car by him" and that there 
was no odor of marijuana found in the car. Aplt. Br. at 11. However, defendant does not 
include: (1) any evidence discovered during the Drug Recognition Evaluation, including 
bloodshot and dilated eyes, poor coordination, body tremors, and rebound (R. 125:117-
123); (2) Officer Marx's expert opinion that defendant "was under the influence of 
marijuana and was not . . . able to safely operate a motor vehicle" (R. 125:128); (3) the 
fact that defendant made an improper lane change (R. 125:74); and (4) the fact that 
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marijuana was found in his truck, and that a freshly packed marijuana pipe was thrown 
from the car while defendant was pulling over (R. 125:81). 
Accordingly, even if preserved, defendant's sufficiency claim should be rejected 
for failure to marshal the supporting evidence. See Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, at f 16. 
C. Defendant's claim lacks merit because actual unsafe operation of a vehicle 
is not an element of driving under the influence of drugs. 
Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient because the State did not prove 
that he operated his vehicle in an unsafe manner. Aplt. Br. at 8, 10-12. This argument 
misconstrues the requirements of the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) reads as follows: " A person may not operate 
or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person:... is under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle" (emphasis added). 
Add. A. Defendant states that the issue on appeal is whether there is "enough evidence to 
support a conviction that [defendant] was under the influence of marijuana to a degree 
that he operated the truck in an unsafe manner " Aplt. Br. at 10. Defendant's claim 
that proof of actual unsafe operation of a vehicle is necessary to sustain a conviction for 
driving under the influence of drugs rests on the untenable assumption that the only way 
to prove that a person is "incapable of safely operating a vehicle" is if the person actually 
operates the vehicle unsafely. It would follow from defendant's argument that a person 
cannot commit the crime of driving under the influence of drugs until the person actually 
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commits an unsafe act in a vehicle. Such a result is against the plain language of the 
statute and sound public policy. 
The primary goal to be achieved when interpreting statutes is to "evince the true 
intent and purpose of the legislature. To discern the legislature's intent and purpose, we 
look first to the best evidence of a statute's meaning, the plain language of the act." State 
v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, f 10, 44 P.3d 680 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted) (alterations in original). In doing so, the appellate court seeks to "render all 
parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful," and, therefore, "presume[s] the legislature 
used each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary meaning." Id. Consequently, 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative are 
avoided. Id. 
Under defendant's construction of the statute, a person may only be convicted of 
violating subsection (2)(a)(ii) if they are under the influence of drugs and that influence 
cause the person to operate a vehicle in an unsafe manner. Such a construction violates 
the rules of statutory interpretation stated in Tooele County by replacing the requirement 
that the driver be "rendered... incapable" of safe operation with a requirement that the 
driver actually operate a vehicle unsafely. Had the legislature only wanted to punish 
those who actually drove unsafely, it would have clearly stated so in the statute. The 
wisdom of the legislature's choice of language becomes evident when one considers that 
defendant's interpretation would preclude law enforcement from arresting and charging 
an obviously intoxicated driver until the driver actually made a dangerous maneuver. The 
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public would thus be subject to increased danger from the intoxicated driver while police 
sat idly waiting for the intoxicated driver to maneuver erratically or cause an accident. 
Defendant's suggested construction is also contrary to that of other states that have 
similar DUI statutes and have considered this issue. Other states that have considered this 
exact issue have unanimously held that actual unsafe driving is not an element of the 
crime of driving under the influence. See, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 728 So.2d 662, 667 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1998); Susman v. State, No. A02A719, 2002 WL 1359424 (Ga. Ct. App. 
June 24, 2002); State v. Blair, 974 P.2d 121, 122 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Commonwealth v. 
Tynes, 510 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Mass. 1987); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 751 A.2d 223, 228 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant was incapable of 
safely operating a motor vehicle. First, Officer Marx testified about defendant's 
bloodshot and dilated eyes, poor coordination, body tremors, and rebound (R. 125:117-
23). He rendered his expert opinion that defendant was under the influence of marijuana 
and was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle (R. 125:84, 128, 141-42). If the 
jury trusted Officer Marx's expert qualifications and believed his testimony, then they 
had sufficient evidence to find that defendant was not only under the influence of 
marijuana, but that defendant was sufficiently intoxicated as to be unable to safely operate 
a vehicle. Moreover, the jury could also rely on defendant's own admission that he had 
inhaled a sufficient quantity of marijuana smoke to make him believe that his blood 
would test positive for marijuana use (R. 125:171). Finally, defendant's improper lane 
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change, while not reckless, was unsafe and constituted direct evidence that defendant's 
intoxicated state impaired his ability to safely operate a vehicle (R. 125:74). 
CONCLLSrON 
For the reasons cited above, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &>/ day of August, 2002. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
'&*ZZ-
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Julie George, 32 Exchange 
Place, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, tiaisn?/ day of August, 2002. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a 
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reck-
less driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance 
with Section 62A-8-107; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed sub-
stance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
2 a» A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
u) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given 
within two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (a) Aa part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
24 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4Xd); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court may order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
b The court may, as an alternative to ail or part of a jail sentence. 
require the person to: 
•i* work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court may order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony. 
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution 
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(c) For Subsection (6Xa) or (b), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive 
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(b), the 
court may require the person to participate in home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandato-
rily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and 
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and 
assessment, educational series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to 
pay ail tines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment co?:s. 
the court shall notify the Driver License Division of a failirfe to comply. 
Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the persons 
driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and <3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12Kb), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for 
a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law en-
forcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may 
be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to in-
clude a substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during 
the time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person 
to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement 
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers 
by the court under Subsection (13Xc)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation 
provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (b) shall monitor the 
person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions 
of probation, and court orders received under this article and shall notify 
the court of any failure to comply with or complete that sentence or those 
conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(b)(iii), 
then the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the 
record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of elec-
tronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
Addendum B 
BLED, 
KAREN ALLEN #7454 
Attorney for the Defendant 
P.O. Box 409 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Telephone: (435) 738-2432 
DEC 17 2001 
jOANNEMdJEE.CLE^uTY 
IN THE EIGHT JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY-ROOSEVELT COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KELCEY WILLIAMS CUCH, 
Defendant 
MOTION AND ORDER FOR 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE 
Criminal No. 015000015 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
Conies now KAREN ALLEN, attorney for Defendant, and requests the Court for a Stay 
of Execution of Sentence pending appeal for the following reasons were available. 
1. No Indians or others of color were available in the Jury pool. 
2. Defendant is filing a prompt appeal. 
3. There was not sufficient evidence to convict 
WHEREFORE, undersigned counsel for Defendant requests the Court stay the Execution 
of Sentence in this case until the appeal can be resolved. 
DATED this |3> day of December, 2001. ifa" I/ft*-
KAREN ALLEN 
Attorney for the Defendant 
M U I . U N \S*U'JKU£.K -UK i i OF EXECUTION Oh SENTENCE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion 
and Order for Continuance to: 
Herbert W. Gillespie 
Duchesne County Attorney 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Mr. Kelcey Cuch 
P.O. Box 94 
Ft Duchesne, Utah 84026 
first-class postage prepaid, this I s day of December, 2001. 
Sandi Mott 
Addendum C 
EIGHTH DISTRICT CT-ROOSEVELT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KELCEY WILLIAMS CUCH, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
LAW Sc MOTION 
Case No: 015000015 FS 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Date: January 17, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terrys 
Prosecutor: HERBERT W. GILLESPIE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAREN ALLEN 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 30, 1978 
Audio 
Tape Number: cd2 Tape Count: 2:14:21 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/02/2001 Guilty 
HEARING 
TIME: 2:14 PM This is before the Court for argument for stay on 
sentence. Ms. Allen, then Mr. Gillespie address the Court. The 
Court denies the motion at this time because it is not fully 
presented. 
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